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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte STEVEN LOUIS EATON,
WILLIAM EDWARD SHANNON II,
KAREN LINDA KARAM, and DAVID OWEN DEREES¹

Appeal 2012-008336
Application 10/698,648
Technology Center 3600

Before, MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
KEVIN F. TURNER, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

TURNER, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

¹ LIKEGLUE.com, LLC is the real party in interest.

STATEMENT OF CASE²

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a final rejection of claims 1-6, 8-26, 28-46, and 48-60. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

We AFFIRM.

RELATED APPEALS

An appeal for the instant application was previously filed and decided by this panel.³ In that appeal, we affirmed the Examiner's decision to reject claims 1-6, 8-26, 28-46, and 48-60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Raveis, Jr. and Watanabe. (Previous Dec. 26.) Following that Decision, Appellants submitted a Request for Rehearing, filed April 15, 2010. Upon reconsideration, the panel declined to make any changes to the Previous Decision.⁴

THE INVENTION

Appellants' disclosure relates to a method, system, and computer readable medium for automating phases of real estate transfers. The process creates a real estate record on a server, assigns an identification number to that record, and then receives information through a fax source. The information received is then associated to the real estate record using the

² Our decision will make reference to Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed March 13, 2012) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed May 4, 2012), and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed April 3, 2012).

³ See Previous Decision, Appeal No. 2009-005792, mailed February 19, 2010, hereinafter "Previous Dec.," at 1.

⁴ See Decision on Request for Rehearing mailed July 9, 2010 at 5.

assigned identification number and then stored on the server. (Spec. 2, ¶ [0009].)

Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:

1. A method for automating phases of real estate transfers, said method being centralized on at least one server and carried out over a distributed computer network to a plurality of client computers, said method comprising the steps of:

creating a real estate record on said at least one server;

assigning a document routing number in the form of a unique identification number to said real estate record;

receiving information from any fax source capable of contacting said at least one server irrespective of a fax number of said fax source;

voice prompting a sender of said information to input said document routing number of said real estate record into said fax source;

associating said information to said real estate record using said document routing number; and

storing said information on said at least one server in association with said real estate record.

(App. Br., Claims Appendix 46.)

PRIOR ART REJECTIONS

The prior art references relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims are:

Ouchi	5,675,421	Oct. 7, 1997
Raveis, Jr.	2002/0049624 A1	Apr. 25, 2002
Watanabe ⁵	JP 2001-274946	Oct. 5, 2001

The Examiner rejected claims 1-6, 8-26, 28-46, and 48-60 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi.

ISSUES⁶

Does the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi teach or suggest “a unique record identifier or identification number known as the document routing number (DRN)” and a voice prompt which “prompts the sender to key in the unique document routing number also known as the unique record identifier or unique identification number after the fax number has been dialed,” as generally recited by independent claims 1, 21, and 41 such that it renders obvious the subject matter of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 15-17, 20-22, 28, 29, 31, 35-37, 40-42, 48, 49, 51, 55-57, and 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)?

⁵ This decision cites to the English translation submitted Dec. 30, 2005 (hereinafter “Watanabe”).

⁶ We have considered in this decision only those arguments that Appellants actually raised in the Briefs. Arguments which Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

Does the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi teach or suggest the subject matter of claims 3-6, 10, 12-14, 18, 19, 23-26, 29, 30, 32-34, 38, 39, 43-46, 50, 52-54, 58, 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)?

FINDINGS OF FACT

Claim Interpretation

1. In describing a “record identifier,” Appellants’ Specification discloses that “[e]ach property listing is assigned a unique record identifier or identification number.” Additionally, Appellants’ Specification describes that these record identifiers become known as the Document Routing Number (DRN). (Spec. 31, ¶ [0134].)

2. With regard to “prompting a sender to input said record locator into said fax source,” Appellants’ Specification discloses:

After dialing the central fax number, but prior to sending the fax, the person **70** is voice prompted to enter a mailbox number (aka the Document Routing Number which was discussed previously above) by a procedure or fax manager software **78** that is loaded to one or more of the servers of the system of the present invention. This identifying DRN is the same number that uniquely identifies the property listing within the databases 36 of the system. The person **70** then enters the DRN number, such as by keypad entry that generates tones such as with a touch-tone dialing system. Then the person **70** sends the fax as consistent with current knowledge in the art of fax transmission.

(Spec. 48.)

3. Appellants’ Specification describes that each property listing is assigned a unique record identifier or identification number and a listing

must exist prior to adding information to the listing. (Spec. 31, ¶¶ [0134]-[0135].)

4. Appellants' Specification discloses that "usage is tracked using an audit trail function." (Spec. 4, ¶ [0017].)

Raveis, Jr.

5. Raveis, Jr. is directed to a method and system for generating a customer record for the different stages involved in a real estate transaction. (Abs.)

6. Raveis, Jr. describes that its system includes a server which communicates with a distributed computer network which is capable of hosting multiple databases. (¶ [0056].)

7. Raveis, Jr. describes that the customer record stores data fields such as fields for name and address relating to the tasks associated with the purchase or sale of a property from contract to close. (¶¶ [0017], [0018]; *See also* Fig. 3A.)

8. Raveis, Jr. describes that its databases are used in a relational arrangement. (¶ [0057].)

9. Raveis, Jr. describes submitting the property listing to a multiple listing service. (¶ [0099].)

10. Raveis, Jr. discloses that "'agent', 'real estate agent', 'sales agent' and 'real estate broker' are used interchangeably throughout the subject disclosure." (¶ [0073].)

11. Raveis, Jr. describes that the automated system can provide notifications over email to customers, move consultants, sales agents, and transaction coordinator. (¶¶ [0034], [0035].)

12. Raveis, Jr. describes that its real estate management software program generates and delivers a list of available products and services to customers based on the geographic location of a property. (¶ [0037].)

13. Raveis, Jr. describes creating an accessible history or “activity file” that documents and records all the member’s real estate transactions. (¶ [0120].)

Watanabe

14. Watanabe is directed to an electronic filing system which is designed to transmit, via FAX, documents to a document storage area. (¶ [0009].)

15. Watanabe describes that a special cover sheet includes a receiver ID for identifying the appropriate document storage area. (¶ [0009].)

16. Watanabe describes coding a document into a TIFF format. (¶ [0014].)

17. Watanabe discloses “a document storage mechanism designed to specify, based on the receiver ID information, the document storage area for the corresponding receiver and to store the corresponding communications document into said document storage area.” (¶ [0009].)

Ouchi

18. Ouchi is directed to a facsimile machine with a remote operation mode which allows a caller to remotely access and retrieve data stored on the facsimile machine. (Abs.)

19. Ouchi describes a voice-on-demand routine which provides verbal guidance to a caller. Ouchi describes that callers can access information by entering dial tones which represent different information. (Col. 10, ll. 23-37.)

20. Ouchi discloses that a caller “...can receive a facsimile transmission of a pamphlet explaining details of operations and content of this voice service by inputting 99* now.” (Col. 10, ll. 37-39.)

ANALYSIS

Claims 1-6, 8-26, 28-46, and 48-60 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi.

Independent claims 1, 21, and 41

Appellants contend that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest “a unique record identifier or identification number known as the document routing number (DRN),” and a voice prompt which “prompts the sender to key in the unique document routing number also known as the unique record identifier or unique identification number after the fax number has been dialed,” as generally recited by independent claims 1, 21, and 41. (App. Br. 35.) To support these contentions, Appellants first argue that Raveis, Jr. fails to teach or suggest documents related to a real estate transfer with a document routing number

for storage and retrieval. (App. Br. 27.) Secondly, Appellants assert that Watanabe fails teach voice prompting a sender to input the unique record identifier, and in fact fails to disclose the need for a unique identification number. (App. Br. 31.) We cannot agree with Appellants.

Turning first to Appellants' argument regarding Raveis, Jr., we find that Raveis, Jr. discloses generating a customer record which comprises data fields relating to the tasks associated with the purchase or sale of a property. (FF 5, 7.) Raveis, Jr. discloses that its customer records include fields for names and addresses. (FF 7.) Given the relational arrangement of the database disclosed in Raveis, we find that Raveis, Jr.'s customer record would necessarily be identifiable and searchable based on these data fields, since an address would be unique to each customer's record. (FF 5, 8.) Thus, Raveis, Jr. teaches a real estate record with a means for unique identification.

The Examiner additionally relies on Watanabe to address this limitation. (Ans. 6.) While the Examiner relies of the address field of Raveis, Jr.'s customer records to address a "document routing number," the Examiner additionally relies on Watanabe to address this limitation. Specifically, the Examiner relies on Watanabe's receiver ID which identifies a storage area for an incoming FAX. (FF 14, 15.)

We agree with the Examiner and find the Examiner's interpretation reasonable in light of Appellants' Specification. Specifically, Appellants' Specification describes a "document routing number," as a "record identifier," which is "a unique record identifier or identification number." (FF 1.) Thus, we find the combination teaches or suggests documents

related to a real estate transfer which includes a document routing number, under the broadest reasonable interpretation. *See In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.*, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[d]uring examination [of a patent application, a pending claim is] given [the] broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, and . . . claim language should be read in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art”) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument.

We are equally unpersuaded by Appellants’ argument that Watanabe fails to teach voice prompting a sender to input the unique record identifier, as it attacks the references separately, even though the rejection is based on the combined teachings of the references. Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art disclosures. *See In re Merck & Co. Inc.*, 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Contrary to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner relies on Watanabe to teach receiving information from facsimile equipment and routing that information to a storage area based on a receiver ID. (Ans. 5-6; *See also* FF 14, 17.) To address the instant limitation, the Examiner relies on Ouchi to teach voice prompting a sender to input a document routing number. (Ans. 6.) Specifically, Ouchi teaches a facsimile machine with a remote operation mode which allows caller to access and retrieve stored data using *inter alia* voice prompts. (FF 18, 19.) Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive.

Additionally, Appellants assert that “even if the teachings of Watanabe and/or Ouchi were combinable with the teachings of Raveis it would still require a special cover sheet which needs to be scanned by an image scanner” (App. Br. 30.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ assertion and find that the rejection is not based on Watanabe’s special cover sheet which includes the receiver ID, but instead on the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi. While we agree with Appellants that Watanabe uses a special cover sheet which includes the documents receiver ID, we cannot agree with Appellants that Watanabe does not otherwise generally teach receiving information from facsimile equipment and routing that information to a storage area based on a document routing number. (FF 14-17.) It is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable, without change, to render obvious the invention under review. *In re Sneed*, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

Further, Appellants have not asserted that the proposed modification would have been beyond the capabilities of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Absent such an assertion, we “take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,” and find a person of ordinary skill in the art would overcome those difficulties within their level of skill. *KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007); *See also KSR* at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).

Following, Appellants generally argue, “there is no teaching or suggestion in Raveis, Watanabe, or Ouchi that their teachings may be combined so as to attempt to provide the present invention as recited in the

claims and such motivation only comes from Appellants' disclosure.” (App. Br. 32.) To the extent Appellants seek an explicit suggestion or motivation in the reference itself, this is no longer the law in view of the Supreme Court's holding in *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 418. The Examiner has provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person with ordinary skill in the art would modify the real estate transaction system of Raveis, Jr. to incorporate the electronic facsimile-based filing system of Watanabe (FF 14), with the voice-on-demand routine which provides verbal guidance (i.e., voice prompts) to a caller taught by Ouchi. (FF 19.)

Specifically, the Examiner articulates a rationale based on a party being able to electronically file documents in a transaction based on a voice prompt. (Ans. 5-7.) Thus, a person with ordinary skill in the art would know from Watanabe and Ouchi to apply this faxing technique to Raveis, Jr. since each of the systems are able to transmit information to a server over a communications network while using the voice-on-demand routine of Ouchi to provide voice prompts. (FF 6, 14, 18, 19.) Accordingly, Appellants' arguments with regard to the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi are not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Consequently, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claims 1, 21, and 41 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi.

Dependent claims 3, 23, and 43

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest the step of “transmitting at least a portion of

said real estate record to a multiple listing service,” as recited in claims 3, 23 and 43. Further, Appellants argue their system uses an identifier to accomplish this element and “Raveis, Jr. is completely silent as to the definition of a property listing as well as to the meaning of a customer record.” (App. Br. 36-37.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and agree with the Examiner’s finding that Raveis, Jr. discloses submitting the property listing to a multiple listing service. (FF 9.) The rejection of claims 3, 23, and 43 is in view of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi, and as discussed *supra*, the Examiner relies on the receiver ID taught by Watanabe which associates and stores the information transmitted by a user to the appropriate customer real estate record disclosed in Raveis, Jr. (*See* Ans. 6.) Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the step of “transmitting at least a portion of said real estate record to a multiple listing service.” Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 4, 24, and 44

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest the step of “converting said information into a digital document to be associated and stored in accord with said associating and storing steps.” (App. Br. 37.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and find that Watanabe teaches coding a document into a TIFF format. (FF 16.) Thus, Watanabe converts a faxed document into a digital

document and then associates and stores, as discussed *supra*. Therefore, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 5, 25, and 45

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest the step of “determining whether said record identifier matches any of a number of a plurality of real estate records,” as recited in claims 5, 25, and 45. Specifically, Appellants argue, “Watanabe teaches a ‘receiver 10’ but completely fails to identify ‘receivers’ nor does Watanabe define a receiver ID in any way, shape or form within the complete prior art reference.” (App. Br. 38.) We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument and find that the receiver ID taught by Watanabe could be assigned as any field in the customer record disclosed in Raveis, Jr. in order to uniquely identify it. (FF 7, 8.) Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi makes obvious the step of “determining whether said record identifier matches any of a number of a plurality of real estate records.” Therefore, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 6, 26, and 46

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest the “storing step comprises saving said digital document on said at least one server in accord with a matching real estate record if said determining step is positive,” as recited in claims 6, 26, and 46. (App. Br. 38.) We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument and find

that the receiver ID taught by Watanabe could be assigned as any field in the customer record disclosed in Raveis, Jr. in order to uniquely identify it. (FF 7, 8). Additionally, the system taught by Watanabe stores a digital copy of the document faxed in a document storage area based on the receiver ID information. (FF 17.) Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the “storing step comprises saving said digital document on said at least one server in accord with a matching real estate record if said determining step is positive.” Therefore, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 10, 30, and 50

With regard to claims 10, 30, and 50, Appellants argue that the Examiner has improperly “equat[ed] the ‘customer record’ to the ‘identifier’ taught by Appellants’ invention.” (App. Br. 39.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and find that the receiver ID taught by Watanabe could be assigned as any field in the customer record disclosed in Raveis, Jr. in order to uniquely identify it. (FF 7, 8.) Moreover, the failure of Ouchi’s disclosure to include certain terms is not persuasive to show nonobviousness. Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 12, 32, and 52

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest the step of “tracking activity on said at least

one server so as to provide an audit trail of said activity corresponding to said real estate record such as date of access, user identification, and the like,” as recited in claims 12, 32, and 52. Specifically, Appellants argue that, “. . . the words ‘audit trail’ are not found in the entire disclosure of Raveis, Jr.” (App. Br. 40.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and while we agree that Raveis, Jr. may not disclose the words “audit trail” per se, Raveis, Jr. does indeed disclose a history or “activity file” that documents and records all the member's real estate transactions. (FF 13.) Thus, similar to an audit trail which Appellants’ Specification describes as a usage tracker (FF 4), the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the step of “tracking activity on said at least one server so as to provide an audit trail of said activity corresponding to said real estate record such as date of access, user identification, and the like.” Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 13, 33, and 53

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest that the “ method is administered by a real estate broker,” as recited in claims 13, 33, and 53. Specifically, Appellants argue that “[s]ince Raveis, Jr. discloses in ¶ 0073 that ‘agent’, ‘real estate agent’, ‘sales agent’ and ‘real estate broker’ are used interchangeably throughout, it is not clear whether [Raveis, Jr.] teaches that the system is capable for administration by a real estate broker” (App. Br. 41.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and find that although Raveis, Jr.

may use the above terms interchangeably, Raveis, Jr. indeed suggests a “real estate broker.” (FF 10.) While Appellants’ claims may recite that the method is administered by a real estate broker, it does not recite that it may not be performed by others nor have Appellants argued that the system is not being administered by one of these users which Raveis, Jr. uses interchangeably. (FF 10.) Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the step that the “method is administered by a real estate broker.” Accordingly, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 14, 34, and 54

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest that the “the step of said real estate broker controlling at least a portion of said information, said at least a portion of information including a list of third party companies with whom said real estate record is associated, such that a listing agent must use only third party companies from said list to conduct said real estate transfer,” as recited by claims 14, 34, and 54. (App. Br. 41.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and find as discussed *supra*, Raveis, Jr. teaches a “real estate broker.” Appellants make no arguments regarding claims 14, 34, and 54 other than those asserted regarding claims 13, 33, and 53. Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the limitation recited by claims

14, 34, 54. Accordingly, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 18, 38, and 58

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest "the step of automatically generating email communications to one or more of a plurality of users based on the happening of an event," as recited in claims 18, 38, and 58. Specifically, Appellants argue, "Raveis, Jr. in ¶ 0034 teaches an automated system of notification to the customer, move consultant, sales agent, and transaction coordinator. [However,] [s]uch notification is extremely limited." (App. Br. 43.) We are not persuaded by Appellants' argument and find that the email notification provided by the automated system in Raveis, Jr. discloses the limitation as claimed by Appellants. (FF 11.) While Appellants may argue the email notifications disclosed by Raveis, Jr. are "extremely limited," Appellants claims, as recited, require nothing more. Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the limitation recited in claims 18, 38, and 58. Accordingly, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 19, 39, and 59

Appellants argue that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi fails to teach or suggest that the "the step of automatically generating an email communication containing advertising information from said real

estate record,” as recited in claims 19, 39, and 59. (App. Br. 43-44.) We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument and find that as discussed *supra*, Raveis, Jr. discloses communication by email. (FF 11.) Additionally, Raveis, Jr. discloses generating and delivering lists of available products and services to customers based on the geographic location of a property (FF 12), which we interpret to be advertisements.

Although, Raveis, Jr. may not explicitly disclose that these lists are delivered via email, given the fact that the system of Raveis, Jr. communicates with customers via email, it would have been obvious to deliver these advertisements by email. Thus, for these reasons and the reasons discussed *supra*, we find the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi renders obvious the limitation recited in claims 18, 38, and 58. Therefore, Appellants’ argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Dependent claims 2, 8, 9, 11, 15-17, 20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 35-37, 40, 42, 48, 49, 51, 55-57, and 60

Appellants do not separately argue claims 2, 8, 9, 11, 15-17, 20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 35-37, 40, 42, 48, 49, 51, 55-57, and 60 which depend from claims 1, 21, and 41 respectively, and so have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi for the same reasons we found as to claims 1, 21, and 41 *supra*.

CONCLUSIONS

We conclude that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi teaches or suggests “a unique record identifier or identification number known as the document routing number (DRN)” and a voice prompt which “prompts the sender to key in the unique document routing number also known as the unique record identifier or unique identification number after the fax number has been dialed,” as generally recited by independent claims 1, 21, and 41, and as such, renders obvious the subject matter of claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 15-17, 20-22, 28, 29, 31, 35-37, 40-42, 48, 49, 51, 55-57, and 60 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

We conclude that the combination of Raveis, Jr., Watanabe, and Ouchi teaches or suggests the subject matter of claims 3-6, 10, 12-14, 18, 19, 23-26, 29, 30, 32-34, 38, 39, 43-46, 50, 52-54, 58, 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION

We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-6, 8-26, 28-46, and 48-60.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). *See* 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED

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